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War Crimes
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HE BIBLE IS REPLETE WITH EXAMPLES of what today we would
consider to be war crimes against humanity, but which in Biblical days
were common and accepted acts of war. Many statements similar to the
following will be found in the Bible:
Thus we put to death all the men, women, and dependents in every city, as we
did to Sihon King ofHeshbon. All the cattle and spoil from the cities we took as
booty for ourselves. l
You shall put all its males to the sword, but you may take the women, the
dependents, and the cattle for yourselves, and plunder everything else in the
city.2
That such actions were typical of the time demonstrates the distance that
constraints on war have traveled over the past two millenia.
Probably one of the earliest war crimes trials of which we have knowledge is
the so,called "Breisach Trial," the trial of Peter von Hagenbach by a
multinational tribunal in 1474. An area of the Upper Rhine, including the
town of Breisach, was pledged to the Duke of Burgundy by the Archduke of
Austria to guarantee a debt. As the Military Governor appointed by the Duke
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of Burgundy, von Hagenbach instituted a brutal policy that included "murder,
rape, illegal taxation and wanton confiscation of private property" against the
citizens of Breisach and of the surrounding area. Eventually, von Hagenbach
was seized by revolting German mercenaries and the citizens of Breisach and
tried by a tribunal consisting of twenty' eight judges, eight from Breisach and
two from each of the other Alsatian, German, and Swiss towns affected. His
defense was "superior orders"-that he was merely complying with the orders
of his master, the Duke of Burgundy. He was found guilty, deprived of his
knighthood, and executed. Although his acts had been committed before the
actual outbreak of war, the occupation of Breisach resembled a wartime
occupation, and his offenses would now be considered to have been war
crimes.3
There were, undoubtedly, war crimes trials conducted in the succeeding
centuries, 4 but we find little documentation in that regard. However, in De Jure
Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, published in 1625, Hugo Grotius said:
The fact must be recognized that kings, and those who possess rights equal to
those kings, have the right of demanding punishment not only on account of
injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of
injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of
nature or of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever.s

In effect, Grotius was saying that any sovereign had the right to try violators of
the law of war even though neither he nor his subjects were the victims of the
illegal act-the doctrine of universal jurisdiction over war crimes.6
During the American Civil War (1861,1865), the so-called Lieber Code,
issued by the Union Army in 1863 as General Orders No. 100, contained the
following provision:
59. A prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes committed against the
captor's army or people, committed before he was captured, and for which he has
not been punished by his own authorities. 7

After the war's end, the Federal authorities tried a number of former
Confederates for war crimes committed during the hostilities.s
Several decades later, during the Philippines "pacification" program that
followed the Spanish,American War (1898), war crimes were committed by
both sides. The United States Army tried not only guerrillas who had violated
the law of war, 9 but also members of its own Army who had done likewise. to
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In and after the Boer War (1899,1902), the British army tried several war
crimes cases, cases involving both its own personnel and personnel of the
enemy. The 1902 Treaty ofVereeniging, which ended that conflict, provided:
IV. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken against any of the burghers so
surrendering or so returning for any acts in connection with the prosecution of
the war. The benefits of this clause will not extend to certain acts contrary to the usage
of war which have been notified by the Commander,in-Chief to the Boer generals and

which shall be tried by court-martial immediately after the close of hostilities. 11

While hostilities were ongoing, the British tried three Australian officers of its
army for war crimes; after the war, a Boer who had misused a white flag was
tried.
During World War I (1914,1918), violations of the law of war, war crimes,
were committed and trials were conducted by both sides. One case which
caused a furor in Great Britain was the trial, conviction, and execution by
Germany of Charles Fryatt, captain of the British merchant vessel S.S. Brussels.
At the outbreak of the war the British Admiralty had instructed all merchant
captains that if approached by a German submarine on the surface, they were
to try to ram it. This happened to Captain Fryatt, who saved his ship by
attempting to ram the submarine which was then forced to depart. A year later
the Brussels was captured by German surface vessels. Captain Fryatt was tried
as having been an illegal combatant. His defense was that he had obeyed the
order of his government. He was convicted and executed. At the time, the
British termed this "judicial murder." As we shall see, the decision of the
German court is now accepted international law.
One article of the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, provided
for the trial of the ex,Kaiser of Germany by an international court "for a
supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties."l2
Today, we would probably designate that offense as falling within the term
"Crimes against Peace." He was never tried because he had sought and
obtained asylum in The Netherlands, which refused to extradite him despite
demands by both France and the United Kingdom. The Treaty also provided
for the surrender, to the former Allies for trial, of individuals alleged to have
committed war crimes during the course of the hostilities. For political reasons,
the Allies eventually agreed that such trials should be conducted by the
Supreme Court of Leipzig. 13 After a dozen cases had been tried at the behest of
Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, most of which resulted in either
unwarranted acquittals or grossly inadequate sentences, the Allies ceased
sending cases to the German court. This experience demonstrated that the
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trial by enemy courts of war crimes allegedly committed by members of the
enemy armed forces or civilian population against members of the armed
forces, civilian population, or property of the victors was not a viable solution
to the problem, and that more just results could be obtained in the courts of the
victors. 14
There were, however, two cases tried by the Supreme Court of Leipzig which
are worthy of mention. Believing that the British were using their hospital
ships, normally exempt from attack, for military purposes, the German
Admiralty announced that such vessels must follow certain prescribed routes;
if they were found in a barred route, they would be subject to attack. Finding
the British hospital ship Dover Castle outside the prescribed routes, a German
submarine sank it without warning. When the submarine commander was tried
by the Supreme Court of Leipzig, his defense was that he had complied with the
orders of his Government and his superiors. Despite the decision in the Fryatt
Case, which had held that compliance with an order of one's government was
no defense; he was acquitted. IS
The second case of interest also involved a British hospital ship, the
Llandovery Castle. While sailing across the Atlantic from Canada to Great
Britain, it was sighted by a German submarine. For some unknown reason, the
German submarine commander decided that it was carrying American aviators
and torpedoed it. When survivors in life boats were interrogated, it became
clear that the only persons who had been aboard were Canadian medical
personnel and the crew. In order to cover up his crime, the German captain
and two of his officers proceeded to machine,gun the lifeboats. One lifeboat
escaped destruction and so the incident became known. At the end of the war,
the captain disappeared, but his two officers were brought to trial. Their
defense was "superior orders." In this case, the Court held that while
compliance with the orders of a superior was normally a good defense, that was
not so where, as here, "the order is universally known to everybody, including
the accused, to be without any doubt whatever against the law." The accused
were found to be guilty of a war crime. I6
In 1928, the "Pact of Paris," also known as the "Kellogg,Briand Pact" after
its progenitors, and technically known as the International Treaty for the
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, was drafted. It was
accepted by forty,four States, including all of the then,major Powers except the
Soviet Union. This Pact provided:
Article 1. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of
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international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy
in their relations with one another.
Article 2. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of
all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be,
which may arise between them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.17
During the course of World War II numerous statements were made by the
members of the Allied Powers to the effect that upon the conclusion of
hostilities there would be trials of those who had violated the law of war,
including those who were responsible for the initiation of the war. Then, on 13
January 1942, nine of the countries at war with Germany signed the
Declaration of St. James. IS The relevant provisions of that Declaration stated
the signatories:
Recalling that international law, and in particular the Convention signed at
The Hague in 1907 regarding the laws and customs of land warfare, does not
permit belligerents in occupied countries to commit acts of violence against
civilians, to disregard the laws in force, or to overthrow national institutions,
(1) affirm that acts of violence thus inflicted on the civilian populations have
nothing in common with the conception of an act of war or a political crime as
understood by civilised nations,

(3) place among their principal war aims the punishment, through the
channel of organised justice, of those guilty of or responsible for these crimes,
whether they have ordered them, perpetrated them or participated in them. 19

In addition, numerous official pronouncements to the same general effect were
made by individual countries and by the Heads ofState.2o On 20 October 1943,
a conference at the British Foreign Office resulted in the establishment of the
United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes (this title was
later changed to the United Nations War Crimes Commission); with the
exception of the Soviet Union, all of the European Allies, and China were
represented. 21
Germany surrendered in May 1945, but even before then discussions had
been entered into concerning the manner in which the punishment of the
European war criminals was to be accomplished. From the beginning, the
United States favored trials for all alleged war criminals, including the leaders.
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The Soviet Union also favored a judicial solution to the problem. The United
Kingdom originally favored a political solution for the leaders, citing the
difficulties of a trial by an international court, but ultimately agreed to a trial.
At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the decision was made that there
would be a trial. The following May, at the organizing meeting for the United
Nations in San Francisco, the United States circulated a draft proposal for such
a trial to the representatives of the Provisional Government of France, the
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. Supreme Court Associate Justice
Robert Jackson was named as Chief Counsel for the United States by President
Truman and immediately began conferring with all concerned. On 25 June
1945 a conference of the four major Powers opened in London. They signed an
Agreement to which was attached a Charter of the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) on 8 August 1945.22 Justice Jackson had offered Nuremberg, in
the American Zone of Occupation, as a suitable place for the trial and this offer
was accepted. 23
The Charter of the International Military T ribunallisted the offenses within
its jurisdiction, some of which were later alleged to be ex post facto. The offenses
listed were: (1) crimes against peace; (2) war crimes; (3) crimes against
humanity; (4) conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing; and (5) membership
by the accused in an organization determined to be criminal. There was no
provision for appeal, the decision of the Tribunal being final.
Two other provisions of the Charter of the IMT are worthy of mention. First,
contrary to prior general custom, but in accordance with the provision of the
Treaty of Versailles for the trial of the ex,Kaiser, the Charter provided:
Article 7. The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or
responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as
freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.

Second, following the decision of the German court in the case of Captain
Charles Fryatt, the Charter provided:
Article 8. The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his government
or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 24

The International Military Tribunal consisted of one judge and one
alternate from each of the four countries. With each State participant having a
Chief Counsel of equal rank, the prosecution could only act by agreement.
After s~me difficulties, twenty,four individuals were indicted25 and, on 18
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October 1945, arraigned in Berlin. The trial itself took place at Nuremberg
from 30 November 1945 to 31 August 1946, with judgment delivered on 1
November 1946. Twelve accused received death sentences; three received
sentences to imprisonment for life; four received sentences to
imprisonment for specified terms; and three were acquitted. 26 The decision
of the Tribunal was unanimous except that the Soviet judge dissented from
the acquittals, the failure to adjudge the death sentence against Rudolph
Hess, and the findings that several organizations were not criminal in
nature. 27
It was argued that "crimes against peace" had not been an international
offense and that, therefore, it was improper to charge the accused with this
offense. The Tribunal found that, in view of the Kellogg,Briand Pact, the
making of aggressive war was a war crime which had existed before the
outbreak of World War II and that the accused could, therefore, be guilty of
the offense of having committed a crime against peace.28
When the Tribunal found that several of the Nazi organizations, such as the
SS, the SD, and the Gestapo, were criminal in nature, that meant that every
member of that organization was guilty of a war crime unless he could prove
that he had not known of its criminal nature when he joined it and that he
personally had never participated in its criminal activities. Inasmuch as the
membership in these organizations numbered in the tens of thousands, the task
of trying them was obviously beyond the resources of the Allied Powers.
Accordingly, this chore was turned over to the German courts, which tried
many thousands of these cases.29
The trial by the International Military Tribunal was only the tip of the
iceberg. The Allied Control Council, the central authority for the four zones of
occupation, enacted a law intended to bring some uniformity into the war
crimes prosecution programs of the four zones of occupation of Germany. The
Military Governor of the United States Zone of Occupation promulgated an
implementing law. Under this law, the United States tried twelve cases, known
colloquially as the "Subsequent Proceedings," involving 185 high,ranking
government, military, and industrial personnel (of whom 35 were acquitted
and 24 received death sentences) ;30 and, under general international law,
United States military commissions sitting in Dachau (a former Nazi
concentration camp) tried 1,062 accused (of whom 256 were acquitted and
426 received death sentences).31 The last two World War II war crimes trials
conducted in Europe were both tried in French courts. In 1987, Klaus Barbie,
who had been the head of the Gestapo in Lyons during the war and who was
responsible for many deportations of Jews and executions, was deported from
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Bolivia where he had taken refuge and where a previous government had
denied extradition. He was convicted of crimes against humanity and
sentenced to imprisonment for life. (He died in prison in 1991.) Then, in 1994,
Paul Touvier, a Frenchman who had headed a branch of the Milice, the French
police organization which supported (and sometimes outdid!) the Nazi
Gestapo, and who had remained hidden in France for all those years, was tried
for the execution of seven Jews in retaliation for the assassination of Philippe
Henriot, a rabid pro,Nazi Frenchman. (It was not alleged that the Jewish
victims had any connection with the assassination.) Touvier was found guilty
of a crime against humanity and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Meanwhile, somewhat similar war crimes trials programs were being
conducted in the Far East. An International Military Tribunal for the Far East
had been established by a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur,
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Its Charter was very much
similar to that of the International Military Tribunal except that it consisted of
eleven judges (one from each of the countries which had signed the Japanese
surrender agreement and one each from India and the Philippines), and
General MacArthur retained a riglit of review. Moreover, there was only one
chief prosecutor (an American) and an assistant prosector from each of the
other participating countries. The main question was whether the Emperor
would be named as an accused. It was finally decided that he would not be
among the accused, primarily because such action would have made the
occupation so much more difficult because of the regard in which he was held
by the Japanese people. There were originally twenty' eight accused, but two
died during the trial and one was found to be incompetent to stand trial. The
accused were arraigned in Tokyo on 3,4 May 1946, and the trial proper ran
from 3 June 1946 until 16 April 1948. The reading of the judgment did not
begin until 4 November 1948 and ended on 12 November. In addition to the
judgment of the Tribunal, there was one separate opinion, one concurring
opinion, and three dissenting opinions. There were seven death sentences,32
sixteen sentences to imprisonment for life, one to imprisonment for twenty
years, and one to imprisonment for seven years. 33
Here, too, there was a multitude of trials by military commissions. The
United States tried cases in Manila, Yokohama, Kwajalein, Guam, and China.
Additionally, the United Kingdom, France, China, Australia, the Netherlands
East India, and the Soviet Union all tried war crimes cases in the Far East.34
As would be expected, in addition to the claim of ex post facto, there were a
number of legal problems presented in the prosecution of all of these war
crimes. Probably the provision which caused the most dispute was that relating
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to the receipt of evidence. Article 19 of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal stated:
The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and
apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non, technical procedure
and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value.

The charters for the other Tribunals and military commissions all had identical
or similar provisions. American lawyers, accustomed to the stringent technical
rules of evidence applicable in the common law system, often argued that this
was unfair to the accused. They overlooked the facts that civil law countries,
which do not have these technical rules of evidence, were equally involved and
that the circumstances of war crimes trials are such that victims and witnesses
may be thousands of miles away in their home countries by the time of trial.
Accordingly, the full" application of the common law rules of evidence would
have made many trials impossible. In order to ensure fairness, the Tribunal
adopted the rule that affidavits would be admissible, but that the opposing
party could challenge the affidavit and demand the production of the affiant as
a live witness. Strange to relate, in the only statistics available on the subject, in
the first seven trials of the "Subsequent Proceedings," the prosecution offered
291 affidavits while the defense offered 3,098. The prosecution challenged 40
of the defense affidavits while the defense challenged 84 of the prosecution
affidavits (64 of the latter challenges were in one case!).35
When the Secretary' General of the United Nations drafted a proposed
Statute for an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons for Serious
Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, a Statute that was approved without
change by the Security Council, Article 15 thereof provided that the Judges of
the Tribunal could adopt rules for the admission of evidence.36 The Judges of
the International Tribunal adopted Rule 89(C), which provides that "A
Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative
value;" and Rule 89(D) which provides that "A Chamber may exclude
evidence ifits probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure
a fair trial."37
The fact that the action charged as a war crime had been performed
pursuant to the order of a superior was advanced in almost every case.
Frequently the evidence established the validity of the claim. Under Article 8
of the Charter, quoted above, and its equivalent in other war crimes laws and
regulations, this was not a defense. However, in such cases where the accused
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was found to be guilty, his sentence would frequently be considerably
mitigated.
When the International Law Commission formulated the principles of the
Charter and judgment of the IMT, its Principles 3 and 4 paralleled Articles 7
and 8 of the Charter. Nevertheless, in every case where the denial of the
defense of "superior orders" has been proposed for inclusion in law of war
conventions drafted since World War II, the proposal has been rejected. 38
However, the Secretary, General did include such a provision denying the
"defense" in the Statutes he prepared for the International Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, and the Security Council retained them. 39
Similarly, the Code of Conduct on Politico,Military Aspects of Security,
adopted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, includes
the following provisions:
30. Epch participating State will instruct its armed forces personnel in
international humanitarian law, rules, conventions and commitments governing
armed conflict and will ensure that such personnel are aware that they are
individually accountable under national and international law for their actions.
31. The participating States will ensure that armed forces personnel vested
with command authority exercise it in accordance with relevant national as well
as international law and are made aware that they can be held individually
accountable under those laws for the unlawful exercise of such authority and
that orders contrary to national and intemationallaw must not be given. The

responsibility of superiors does not exempt subordinates from any of their individual
responsibilities. 40

The responsibility of the commander for the issuance of illegal orders and for
violations of the law of war by his subordinates has also been a major problem.
This question arose early in the war crimes program after World War II when
Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita was tried in Manila in October 1945,
charged with the responsibility for innumerable violations of the law of war
committed by his troops during the battles for the recovery of the Philippine
Islands by the United States. His defense was that he took no action to
terminate these war crimes and punish the offenders, because he was unaware
of the fact that they were being committed. What the military commission
which tried him, and the boards and courts which reviewed the case on appeal,
held was, in effect, that when a commander knew, or should have known, that
troops under his command were committing war crimes, he had a duty to end
such actions and to punish the perpetrators.41
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The responsibilities of the commander for violations of the 1949 Geneva
Convention42 and of the 1977 Additional Protocol 143 are now set forth in
Articles 86(2) and 87 of the latter. They provide:
Article 86. Failure to act
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or
disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information
which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time,
that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not
take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.
Article 87. Duty of Commanders
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require
military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their
command and other persons under their control, to prevent and, where
necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the
Conventions and of this Protocol.
.
2. In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting Parties and
Parties to the conflict shall require that, commensurate with their level of
responsibility, commanders ensure that members of the armed forces under their
command are aware of their obligations under the Conventions and this
Protocol.
3. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require
any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his
control are going to commit or have committed a breach of the Convenrions or
of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations
of the Conventions or this Protocol, and, where appropriate, to initiate
disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof.
The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, mentioned above,
was the first tribunal for the trial of war crimes not established by the victor or
victors. Its judges are elected by the United Nations. Composed of two Trial
Chambers of three judges each and an Appeals Chamber of five judges, it is the
first war crimes court in which there is a right of appeal. In the T adic Case, the
accused challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, but the Appeals Chamber
determined that it was properly established and did have jurisdiction to try
cases involving violations of the law of war which had occurred in the former
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Yugoslavia. At the time of this writing, although the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia has now been in existence for four years, it has tried only
two cases. In the Erdemovic Case there was a guilty plea. (The defendant has
filed an appeal based on the ground that his ten,year sentence is too severe!) In
1997, the Appeals Chamber decided the Ta(lie Case on the merits, convicting
the accused.
In 1994 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 955
establishing a similar Tribunal to try genocide and other war crimes committed
in Rwanda or in neighboring States by Rwandan citizens. The Statute for this
Tribunal is identical, mutatis mutandis, to that of the Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia. The Appeals Chamber already established will function for both
Tribunals.
For many years the International Law Commission has been charged with
the task of drafting a Statute for an International Criminal Court. In a Draft
Statute prepared in 1993, the jurisdiction of the Court included, among others,
the crimes of genocide and grave breaches of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocol 1.44 It would also have jurisdiction
over crimes of aggression where the Security Council of the United Nations
"has first determined that the State concerned has committed the act of
aggression which is the subject of the charge.,,45 The Draft Statute is still in an
embryonic stage. It was the subject of the work of a preparatory committee and,
unless there are developments to the contrary, a diplomatic conference will be
convened in 1998 to draft a convention establishing an international criminal
court.46
The most recent action of the United States in this area occurred on 21
August 1996 when the President approved the "War Crimes Act of 1996."47 It
provides:
§2401. War crimes
(a) OFFENSE. Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States,
commits a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, in any of the circumstances
described in subsection (b), shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or
any term of years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject
to the penalty of death.
(b) CIRCUMSTANCES. The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are
that the person committing such breach or the victim of such breach is a member
of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States (as
defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
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(c) DEFINITIONS. As used in this section, the term "grave breach of the
Geneva Conventions" means conduct defined as a grave breach in any of the
international conventions relating to the laws of warfare signed at Geneva 12
August 1949 or any protocol to any such convention, to which the United States
is a party.
Heretofore, when a nation tried one of its own personnel for a violation of
the law of war such as a grave breach of one of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
as in the Calley Case, it has not been considered to be a war crimes case,
although, in fact, that was what it was. Insofar as the United States is
concerned, such a trial will, in the future, unquestionably be a war crimes case.
Apparently, Congress did not consider it necessary to include the commission
of such offenses by non,nationals of the United States, whether committed
against American or foreign personnel. There can be no doubt that they are
already war crimes within the jurisdiction of the United States.
On 19 October 1996, the President approved an Act which includes the
following provision:
§ 2. Sense of The Congress.

It is the sense of the Congress that United States Government agencies in
possession of records about individuals who are alleged to have committed Nazi
war crimes should make these records public. 48
This Act was considered necessary because of the overly strict construction
that many government agencies are following in application of the Freedom of
Information Act.
The laws against war crimes, like all penal laws, have two purposes: 1) to
discourage their commission; and 2) to punish offenders. During the past
half,century the international community has failed in both of these areas. The
rare possibility of trial after the termination of hostilities does not greatly
discourage the commission of further offenses during the course of hostilities;
the complete failure to punish individuals for the commission of war crimes
even after the termination of hostilities certainly does not discourage their
commission in the next conflict that occurs.49 It remains to be seen whether the
action of the Security Council of the United Nations in the Former Yugoslavia
and in Rwanda, and the possible creation of an International Criminal Court,
will have any lasting effect. 50
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10. U.S. v. Brig. Gen. Jacob A. Smith, reprinted in Friedman, supra note 2, at 799; U.S. v.
Major Edwin F. Glenn, reprinted in id. at 814; United States v. Lt. Preston Brown, reprinted in id.
at 820; etc.
11. 2 Israel, supra note 6, at 1145, 1146 (emphasis added).
12. 2 T.I.A.S., at 43,136 (Charles Bevans ed., 1969); 13 AM. J. INTLL (Supp.) 151 (1919).
13. The Allies had originally submitted a list of about 890 names of individuals wanted for
trial, including the Crown Prince, General von Hindenburg, Admiral von Tirpitz, and many
other former leaders of Germany. The list submitted to the Supreme Court of Leipzig contained
only 45 names.
14. One of the most vehement opponents of this conclusion was himself tried and acquitted in
the so-called I.G. Farben Case (U.S. v. Carl Krauch). See VON KNIERIEM, THE NUREMBERG
TRIALS (1959). The fairness of the trial was rarely an issue raised by the accused. The one case in
which this might be said to have become a major issue was In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946),
discussed below.
15. 16 AM.J. INTLL 704 (1922), 2 ANN. DIG.429 (1922). This decision was probably based
upon a finding that, under the circumstances, the order of the German Admiralty was a legal
order.
1.6. 16 AM. J. INT'L L 708 (1922); 2 ANN. DIG. 436 (1922).
17. 46 Stat. 2343, 94LN.T.S.57, 22AM.J. INTLL (Supp.) 171 (1928), 128B.F.S.P.447.
18. The group which initiated this action was then known as the Inter-Allied Conference on
the Punishment of\Xfar Crimes. The name was later changed to the Inter-Allied Commission on
the Punishment of War Crimes.
19. It is reproduced in THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAws OF WAR 90 (1948).
20. The most important of these Declarations was probably that made at Moscow by Prime
Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin in November 1943. Id. at 107.
21. The Soviet Union was not represented because it had demanded that seven of its
constituent Republics, which were actively engaged in the war, each be represented, a demand
which had not been met. Id. at 112. The United Nations \Xfar Crimes Commission functioned
until 1948, receiving trial records from its member nations, many of which were published with a
discussion of the applicable law in a 15-volume set of books, UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION, LAw REpORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (1947-49):.22. Nineteen other nations subsequendy adhered to the London Agreement.
23. The history of the negotiations that culminated in the 1945 London Agreement and the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal is recorded in REpORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON,
UNITED STATES REpRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY
TRIALS, Department of State Publication 3080 (1949).
24. 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 3 Bevans 1240. The comparable provisions of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East state:
Article 7. Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an
accused acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall, of itself, be
sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for any crime for which he is charged,
but such circumstances may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal
determines that justice so requires.
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T.1.A.S. 1589,4 Bevans 27. It will be noted that here, unlike the London Charter, the fact that
the accused complied with an order of his Government may be considered in mitigation of
punishment.
25. One accused was found to be incompetent, another committed suicide, and a third,
Martin Bormann, was tried in absentia, so there were actually twenty-one accused present in
Court. (Although Bormann was not present in Court, he was represented by defense counsel.)
26. The three who were acquitted soon found themselves facing German courts, where all
three were convicted of having violated German law!
27. One accused, Hermann Goering, committed suicide before he could be hung. He and
those who were executed were all cremated and their ashes spread to the winds. With the
exception of Hess, the others, including those with life sentences, either died or were released
prior to the expiration of their sentences. The Soviet Union refused to agree to Hess' release.
When he died (or committed suicide) in 1987, he was the only major war criminal still
imprisoned in Spandau Prison in Berlin.
28. After years of debate in the League of Nations and in the United Nations, in 1974 the
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution in which one paragraph
specifically provides that "A war of aggression is a crime against international law." G.A. Res.
3314 (XXIX), Dec. 14, 1974, 13 1.L.M. 710,714 (1974).
29. The Allied authorities considered that by assigning the task to the German courts, they
would determine the extent of their de-Nazification. Since these cases were, for the most part,
trials of Germans for offenses committed against other Germans, they were not then considered
to be war crimes trials.
30. Each of these twelve trials was conducted by three American judges, usually borrowed
from state courts. The 1.G. Farben Case, referred to supra, in note 14 was Case No.6 of these
cases.
31. The great majority of these cases fell into three categories: lynching of downed Allied
airmen, concentration camp personnel, and acts of euthanasia. During this period, the British
tried 1,085 accused in their zone, of whom 348 were acquitted and 240 received the death
sentence; France tried 2,107 accused, of whom 404 were acquitted and 104 received death
sentences; and the Soviet Union tried 14,240 accused of whom 142 were acquitted and 138
received death sentences. (The statistics provided by the Soviet Union are not generally
accepted. There were 66 death sentences in just 9 cases recorded by the United Nations War
Crimes Commission. United Nations Archives, UN\VCC, Reel 36.)
32. Unlike the procedure followed in Germany, the ashes of the individuals who were
sentenced to death were preserved and are now buried in what is considered to be a shrine!
33. The individual who received the seven year sentence was Maroru Shigemitsu. Like the
others, he received an early release from confinement and four years later he was the Foreign
Minister of]apan!
34. Strange to relate, although the Soviet Union was in the war for less than a week, it tried
several thousand war crimes cases and still held Japanese as war crimes prisoners in 1955, long
after all the other countries had caused the release of their prisoners.
35. HOWARD LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 260n.131 (1994).
36. U.N.Doc. S!25704, May I, 1993,32 1.L.M. 1192, 1196 (1993).
37. U.N. Doc. IT/32, March 14,1994,33 1.L.M. 484, 533 (1994).
38. See Howard Levie, The Rise and Fall of an Internationally Codified Denial of the Defense of
Superior Orders, 30 REVUE DE DROIT MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 184 (1991),
reprinted in LEVIE ON THE LAW OF \XlAR (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998)
[forthcoming]. Many nations have provisions in their civil penal law that make compliance with
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the orders of a superior a defense. This is probably a major reason for their objection to denying it
to the military. Moreover, the national representatives at Diplomatic Conferences probably fear,
with reason, that military discipline would be adversely affected, as it might cause a subordinate
to refuse to obey an order that is legitimate but which the subordinate believes to be illegal.
39. The provisions of the Statute for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
frequently follow the London Charter. Thus, its Article 7 states:
Article 7: Individual Criminal Responsibilities

1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of
the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
3. The fact that anyone of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present statute
were committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if
he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had
done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
.
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a
superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment, if the International Tribunal determines that justice so
requires.
40. 12 TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 7, 11
(Howard Levie ed., 1997).
41. This case ultimately reached the United States Supreme Court which, in In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), sustained the conviction by a vote of six to two.
42. 1949 Geneva Conventions relative to the Protection of Victims of War, 6 U.S.T.
3114/3217/3316/3516, T.LA.S. Nos. 3362/3363/3364/3365,75 U.N.T.S. 31/85/135/287, 157
B.F.S.P. 234/262/284/355.
43. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 457
(1978); 16 LL.M. 1391 (1977). To date the United States has not ratified this Protocol.
44. U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (M8/1O), at 255 (1993),33 LL.M. 253 (1994)
(art. 22, at 264; art. 23, at 268; and art. 26 at 268). The Commission has also long engaged in the
task of preparing a Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Article 20
of the 1996 draft, entitled "War Crimes," is quite complete in its coverage of both customary and
conventional war crimes. U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp No. 19, U.N.Doc. N51/10 (1996); 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 369 (1997).
45. Art. 27,33 LL.M. 270 (1994). The overall provisions proposed for jurisdiction are far
from satisfactory.
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46. G.A. Res. 51/207, Dec. 17, 1996, 36 1.L.M. 510 (1997). Much as he favors the
establishment of such a Court, the present writer is not optimistic that States, particularly the
United States, will ratify such a Convention.
47. Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104, 18 U.S.c. 240l.
48. Pub. L. No. 104-309, 110 Stat. 3815.
49. The United Nations Command was prepared to try about 200 individuals for war crimes
committed during the Korean War (1950-1953). No trials took place because of the provisions
of the Armistice Agreement requiring the repatriation of any prisoner of war who so desired.
During the conflict in Vietnam, the United States tried a number of its own personnel [see
United States v. Calley, 46 CMR 1131 (1973), affd48 CMR 19 (1973), habeas corpus granted,
382 F. Supp. 650 (1974), rev'd 519 F. 2d 184 (1975), eert. den. 425 U.S. 911 (1976)]. See also
GARY 1. SOLIS, SON THANO: AN AMERICAN WAR CRIME (1997). It tried none of the enemy
despite criminal acts such as the shooting of two innocent American prisoners of war as a reprisal
for the trial and execution by the South Vietnamese of a terrorist bomber caught in the act.
50. In Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), eert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2542 (1996) 34
1.L.M. 1595 (1995), the United States Circuit Court, Second Circuit, held that under the Alien
TortActof1789 and the Torture Victim Protection Act of1991 [106 Stat. 73 (1992),28 U.S.C.
1350 note (Supp. V, 1993)], civil suit could be brought in United States Courts against the
perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in foreign countries by the
victims or theirrepresentatives where service of process was accomplished in the United States.
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